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Engineering

Security belongs at the point of execution.

AI systems can generate plans, select tools, and request operations across connected services. Securing the model's output alone does not determine whether a requested operation should be permitted.

SAILLENT is engineered around a separate enforcement boundary: evaluate covered requests against explicit policies and control whether they proceed through the protected execution path.

Intercept. Inspect. Enforce.

The enforcement architecture

Conceptual Architecture — Exact routing depends on deployment
AI Agent /ApplicationSAILLENT ENFORCEMENT BOUNDARYInterceptRequestInspectPolicy EvalEnforceAllow / DenyAUDIT RECORD LOGGEDModel Provider(OpenAI, etc.)Tools / APIs(MCP, Internal)UNROUTED (NO COVERAGE)

Model requests and tool executions are distinct paths. Direct calls bypass the enforcement boundary and require separate controls.

SAILLENT introduces a runtime policy evaluation layer into configured AI request paths.

01

Request

An AI application or agent sends a request through a configured SAILLENT interface.

02

Interception

The runtime receives the request on the protected path. Requests that bypass the runtime are outside that path's coverage.

03

Policy evaluation

The runtime evaluates request context against applicable policy rules.

04

Decision

The runtime determines whether the covered operation is allowed or denied.

05

Forward or block

Allowed requests proceed through the configured path. Denied requests are prevented from proceeding.

06

Audit

The decision and available context are recorded, subject to deployed configuration.

Reproducible Test Scenario: Unauthorized Tool Execution

To validate enforcement behavior, we simulate an agent attempting an action outside its permitted scope. This demonstrates the runtime's decision logic, audit output, and failure handling.

Test Execution: v2.4.1 (Linux/amd64)
# 1. Test Setup
Agent Role:      payment-operations
Target Tool:     payments.create_instruction
Requested Action: Write
Active Policy:   payments-production (v14) — allowed_actions: [Read]

# 2. Runtime Evaluation
Intercept:       Request captured at configured enforcement boundary.
Inspect:         Context matched against policy v14.
Decision:        DENY (Action 'Write' not in allowed_actions for this agent_role).

# 3. Enforcement Action
Forward/Block:   Request blocked. Upstream tool not invoked.
Audit Record:    Logged to local SQLite + SIEM export (if configured).
                 {
                   "timestamp": "2026-10-10T14:22:01Z",
                   "agent_id": "payment-ops-agent-01",
                   "tool_id": "payments.create_instruction",
                   "policy_id": "payments-production",
                   "policy_version": 14,
                   "decision": "DENY",
                   "reason": "Action not permitted by active policy"
                 }

Note: This is a controlled, simulated test scenario. Actual audit schemas and runtime versions depend on your deployed configuration. View full testing methodology →

Model requests and tool executions are distinct paths with distinct enforcement points. Exact routing depends on deployment configuration.

Policy as code

Security policies should be explicit, reviewable, and operationally manageable. SAILLENT uses structured policies to describe which operations are permitted for configured agent and tool contexts. A published policy example:

policy example — published structure
policy:
  id: payments-production
  version: 14
  agent_role: payment-operations
  tool_id: payments.create_instruction
  allowed_actions:
    - Read
  risk_level: high
  is_active: true
FieldPurpose
id / versionIdentify the rule and its revision, so decision records can reference the exact policy evaluated.
agent_roleThe agent context to which the rule applies.
tool_idThe tool or operation covered by the rule.
allowed_actionsPermitted action categories for this agent-tool pair.
risk_levelRisk classification applied to the covered operation.
is_activeWhether the policy is currently enabled.

This example reflects SAILLENT's published policy structure. Consult the technical documentation for the complete schema of your deployed runtime version, including how empty or absent allowed_actions are interpreted.

Default-deny design

A default-deny policy model denies requests that do not match an applicable permission rule. This reduces reliance on implicit authorization — it does not, by itself, prove that every possible action is covered or that every failure condition is handled securely.

Policy lifecycle

The runtime design supports policy updates from a configured policy source, with periodic refresh and last-known-good behavior when that source becomes unavailable. The exact behavior depends on the failure condition: startup without a valid policy, malformed policy updates, runtime failures, and downstream connectivity failures must each be evaluated separately. See deployment documentation for the documented behavior of each case.

Enforcement, not just observation

Monitoring can show that an operation was attempted. Runtime enforcement can control whether a covered operation proceeds.

CapabilityEngineering purpose
Request interceptionBring covered operations into the enforcement path
Policy evaluationApply explicit authorization rules
Allow or denyControl whether a covered request proceeds
Policy versioningIdentify which policy revision was active at decision time
Decision recordsSupport investigation and operational review
Policy refreshApply supported policy updates without a full redeployment

These capabilities do not eliminate the need for IAM, secure credentials, network controls, monitoring, or application-level authorization.

Security boundaries and failure behavior

A security control must be evaluated not only by what happens during normal operation, but also by what happens when dependencies fail. These are separate cases with separate behaviors:

Coverage boundaries

SAILLENT enforces only on execution paths that pass through its configured enforcement point. Direct provider calls, alternate credentials, and unprotected tools are bypass paths that need separate controls.

Policy-source failures

When the configured policy source is unavailable, documented last-known-good behavior preserves the previously loaded policy state. This is not a universal guarantee for every startup, parsing, or storage failure.

Downstream failures

Provider timeouts, network failures, malformed responses, and unavailable tools affect whether a request completes — distinct from the policy decision itself.

Audit failures

Audit storage and enforcement decisions are distinct concerns. Understand what happens if audit persistence fails, whether the request continues, and what evidence may be missing.

License and service availability

Licensing, hosted control-plane availability, and runtime enforcement are separate architectural concerns. Deployment documentation states the actual behavior for expired licenses, revocation, connectivity loss, and recovery.

Performance engineering

Runtime enforcement adds work to a request path. Its performance must be measured under representative workloads rather than described with unsupported latency claims. A meaningful benchmark documents:

  • Runtime version and build; hardware, OS, and deployment topology
  • Request and response sizes; policy complexity and matching behavior
  • Concurrency, throughput, and latency percentiles (p50, p95, p99)
  • Error rates and test duration
  • Whether measurements include upstream model-provider latency or only runtime overhead

We publish performance figures only when they are supported by reproducible measurements and a clearly described methodology.

Auditability and operational evidence

A policy decision is more useful when operators can investigate why it occurred. Depending on the configured audit schema, decision records can support analysis of:

  • The agent and tool context associated with a request
  • The decision made by the runtime and the policy associated with it
  • The recorded reason or matching context
  • Relevant timestamps and available request metadata

Audit records should not automatically be described as immutable or tamper-proof. Those properties depend on storage architecture, permissions, integrity controls, retention configuration, and independent verification. For production deployments, define retention requirements, access restrictions, export needs, and the relationship between runtime logs and your SIEM or incident-response processes.

Built for defense in depth

Identity and access management

Establishes who or what can authenticate and which permissions it holds.

Runtime enforcement

Evaluates covered requests against configured policies at the protected execution boundary.

Monitoring and incident response

Detects suspicious behavior, investigates events, and coordinates response.

Governance and change management

Establishes how policies are approved, reviewed, deployed, and maintained.

No single layer replaces the others. The overall security outcome depends on the architecture, configuration, coverage, and operation of the combined controls.

Technical transparency

We believe security infrastructure should be evaluated on verifiable behavior rather than broad promises. For technical evaluations, we can discuss the applicable runtime version, supported interfaces, policy schema, deployment model, failure behavior, audit fields, and available test evidence. Claims about performance, security assurance, certifications, or comprehensive attack prevention should be supported by evidence appropriate to the specific claim.

Engineering questions

Does SAILLENT inspect every prompt?

Coverage depends on how requests are routed and which interfaces are configured. Do not assume every prompt, model call, or tool operation is inspected simply because SAILLENT is installed.

Does SAILLENT determine whether an AI model is telling the truth?

No. SAILLENT's core enforcement role is to evaluate covered requests against configured policies. This is distinct from proving the factual correctness of model output.

Does SAILLENT replace an identity provider or policy framework?

No. It adds runtime enforcement to configured request paths and should be integrated with your broader identity and security architecture.

What happens when a policy source is unavailable?

The runtime supports last-known-good policy behavior when its configured policy source becomes unreachable. Other failure conditions have their own behavior and are reviewed in the applicable technical documentation.

Can the runtime operate without a hosted dashboard?

Deployment and licensing dependencies vary by supported configuration. Consult the current deployment documentation before assuming any hosted service is optional for a particular installation.

Where can I find implementation details?

The technical documentation is the reference for installation, configuration, policy schemas, supported interfaces, deployment, and troubleshooting.

Build with a clear enforcement boundary.

Explore the technical documentation or speak with our team about your deployment architecture and enforcement requirements.

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TRUST & COMPLIANCE

Built for the frameworks your auditors care about

SAILLENT produces the cryptographic, exportable evidence regulated teams need — across the US, Canada, and Europe. Explore compliance tooling →

SOC 2 Type II United States
DESIGNED FOR
Trust Services Criteria controls
ISO 27001:2022 European Union
DESIGNED FOR
Information security controls
GDPR European Union
CAPABILITIES FOR
EU data protection requirements
HIPAA United States
CAPABILITIES FOR
Healthcare privacy controls
NIST AI RMF United States
ALIGNED WITH
AI risk management framework
ISO/IEC 42001 European Union
ALIGNED WITH
AI management systems
OSFI E-23 Canada
RELEVANT TO
Financial AI oversight requirements
SR 11-7 United States
RELEVANT TO
Model risk management requirements
Saudi PDPL Saudi Arabia
CAPABILITIES FOR
Kingdom personal data protection law
SDAIA AI Governance Saudi Arabia
ALIGNED WITH
National data & AI authority guidance
SAMA Fintech Oversight Saudi Arabia
RELEVANT TO
Saudi Central Bank fintech supervision
UAE PDPL United Arab Emirates
CAPABILITIES FOR
Federal Decree-Law 45/2021 data protection
CBUAE AI Guidance United Arab Emirates
RELEVANT TO
UAE Central Bank AI governance for finance
ADGM FSRA United Arab Emirates
RELEVANT TO
Abu Dhabi Global Market financial regulation
China PIPL China
CAPABILITIES FOR
Personal Information Protection Law
MLPS 2.0 China
RELEVANT TO
Multi-Level Protection Scheme cybersecurity

Capability claims only — formal certifications & attestations in progress · Technical evidence available under NDA

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